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R E M A R K S
ON
GENERAL BURGOYNE'S
S T A T E
OF THE
EXPEDITION from CANADA.

[Price 1s.]



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REMARKS
ON
GENERAL BURGOYNE'S
STATE
OF THE
EXPEDITION from CANADA.

" Allied, alas! for ever, to the crime,
" No kind exemption can the person claim,
" But blackens downward on the lapse of time,
" The equal object of eternal shame."

L O N D O N :

Printed for G. WILKIE, in St. Paul's Church Yard,
MDCCLXXX.



REMARKS

ON

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T O
LIEUT. GEN. BURGOYNE.

S I R,

HAD you simply informed the Public, that the expedition you commanded was originally planned upon the principle of a co-operation with the southern army; that Sir William Howe declined a co-operation; that you heartily acquiesced in his determination, and supposing yourself able to act independently of him, undertook the enterprize alone, and thereby lost your army; that you have long been sensible of your error, and sincerely lament the misfortunes into which you plunged your companions, as well as the calamity with which you overwhelmed your country; you would have made an interest in the hearts of the compassionate, that ministerial *vengeance* would have been unable to
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reach. However open you might be to the *justice* of your country, ingenuousness and misfortune interwoven would have rendered you invulnerable to the shafts of *malice*; the immoveable barrier of truth would have resisted the torrent of *party rage*; and though no laurel should adorn your monument, nor splendid trophy reflect a lustre on it, late posterity, while they feel the effects of your indiscretion, would have done equal justice to your candour and intrepidity.

But, having rejected the solid basis of fact, and rested your defence on equivocation, the superstructure, however finished and decorated, must fall, and bury your reputation under its ruins, or stand only to perpetuate your infamy.

When we see you repeatedly making a winter's voyage from America, and on the instant of your arrival soliciting to be sent back on arduous service, we cannot think ill health to be the inducement. When a man is known to indulge in open and shameless gallantry, we cannot suppose his conjugal affection so
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vehement as to affect his public conduct. When we read in your letters, that you asked Sir Henry Clinton's advice whether you should persevere in executing *your* orders, and advised Col. St. Leger to consult his judgment whether he should persevere in executing *his* orders, it is impossible to believe that you deemed either so peremptory as to preclude the exercise of discretion. While you are arguing with Sir Guy Carleton to induce him to depart from his instructions, we cannot so readily admit your religious attachment to *your own*. When we learn by authentic documents that the magazine of Bennington was not even known to you till after Col. Baum had received his orders and begun his march, we cannot accede to its having been the principal object of the expedition. Convinced that you requested Sir William Howe to permit you to act independently of him, and knowing that he had acquainted you that you would have *no direct assistance from the southern army*, we can neither admit the justice of your complaint of having been left to fight your way *through a host of foes, alone*, or believe that you expected a *co-operating army at*

Albany. Evidence is irresistible: whatever we may wish, the mind is so constructed, that we must conclude that ill health, conjugal affection, peremptory orders, Bennington magazine, and a failure of co-operation are mere pretexts, for other motives and springs of action that you wish to conceal.

When, in one letter, you admit that the Bennington expedition was "*out of the beaten track of military service*;" and in another say it was justifiable on "*naked military principle*;" when in your letter to the Secretary of State (before passing the Hudson) you say, "Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think "it my duty to wait in this position (east side), "or perhaps as far back as fort Edward, "where my communication with lake George "would be perfectly secure, 'till some event "happened to assist my movement forward;" and in the review of the evidence, "*that you "were compelled by the state of things to act "as you did, independently of the peremptory "tenor of your orders*;" when we read in your proclamation, that the present unnatural rebellion has been made a foundation for the
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completeſt ſyſtem of tyranny that ever God, in his diſpleaſure, ſuffered to be exerciſed over a froward and ſtubborn generation ; that arbitrary imprifonment, confiscation of property, and torture unprecedented in the in-quiſition of the Romiſh church, are among the palpable enormities ; that theſe are inflicted by aſſemblies and committees, who dare to profeſs themſelves friends to liberty, upon the moſt quiet ſubjects, without diſtinction of age or ſex, for the ſole crime, often for the ſole ſuſpicion, of having adhered in principle to the government under which they were born, and to which, by every tie, divine and human, they owe allegiance ; and in the ſtate of the expedition, find you comparing the ſame rebels with the *great prince of Orange* and the *Engliſh parliament* ; when you are known ſometimes to approve, and ſometimes to reprobate the employing the native Indians ; ſometimes to extol, and at others to decry the ſervices of the loyaliſts ; whatever allowances the partiality of friends may make, the world in general will think you either deficient in memory or deſtitute of principle.

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We may, now, it is presumed, congratulate you on the return of your health, without incurring your displeasure : and the Public might rejoice that the horrors of an American *winter* have vanished, were they not succeeded by the terrors of an American *prison*, and the fear of receiving your *death* from the hands of a people to whom you have been so great a benefactor.

In the review of the evidence, you complain of the noble lord, with whom you say you are at issue, for not making a *defence*, nor even *contradicting* any thing you alleged respecting his conduct, or your own.

I admit the parliamentary enquiries to have been as unsatisfactory as they were unprecedented ; but I believe this is the first instance of a trial being challenged as unfair, by the party who reaped all the benefit of the partiality. You did indeed state your own case, and produce your own friends and favourites to support it, without interruption, opposition, or reply ; if, therefore, all mankind do not with one voice approve and applaud
your

your conduct, it is because your cause is so bad as not to admit of colouring. To form a just estimate of this grievance, we need only reflect on the change of complexion, that the examination of two witnesses only, wrought in Sir William Howe's enquiry.

I agree with you, that there were many considerations in favour of your committing the care of your defence to your friends, or to anonymous publications. Your own pænegyric would have been written with more grace by some friend, and still greater would have been the effect, if a disinterested person had been the author of it; and the declaration that "it has been a reflection on *your character* that you addressed the noble lord as a patron and friend," would not have been quite so ludicrous in an anonymous publication.

I shall leave you in quiet possession of a great part of your book, because it is immaterial to the points in question.

The

The episode of Lady Harriet Ackland would figure in a poem ; a romance without an heroine would be an innovation ; a tragedy without female distress would be a violation of the laws of the drama : and God forbid that I should imitate the impiety of the rebels, who with more than Gothic barbarity interrupted the funereal honours of the gallant Frazer *!

Your having supplanted Sir Guy Carleton, is rather a private concern between you and him, than a matter interesting to the Public.

If he is satisfied with your conduct in that respect, or if Sir W. Howe supposes you had not concerted measures for supplanting him, in case you had been successful in the Canada expedition, I don't know who has a right to complain. I shall only remark, that the circumstance you plume yourself so much upon, viz. that the minister wrote to Sir G. Carleton,

* No disrespect is intended to Lady Harriet Ackland, but I do not see the propriety of G. B. introducing her ladyship into this controversy.

in August 1776, that he was to remain in Quebec, is not conclusive, because you were in England in the winter 1775, when you had an *opportunity* to solicit a separate command by *adulatory intrigue*, and at that time your *ambition was not dead*. That Sir Guy was both disappointed and displeased, appears from your letter to Lord George Germaine, of 14th of May, wherein you say, "that Sir Guy Carleton was anxiously desirous of leading the military operations out of the province, is easily to be discerned;" and by your letter to General Harvey, of May 19, wherein you write, "that Sir Guy Carleton should have wished for the lead in active and important military operations, is very natural. That he thinks he has some cause of *resentment* for the general terms of treatment he has received from some of the king's ministers, is discernible, &c." Let me add, if his *resentment* did not dictate the letter to you, of Nov. 12, it gave a *tinge* to it. It must be presumed, that when that letter was wrote, Sir Guy was not apprized of the plan of operations that you had laid before the ministry, in which you not only specified the corps for

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the operating army, but descended to the posts and garrisons necessary for the security of Canada, which plan, so far at least, was literally adopted. This extraordinary letter is manifestly a conclusion from premises contained in a letter from you, and it would be but fair to publish that likewise.

You complain of "every discretionary latitude which you proposed having been erased." It may not be improper here to state the substance of your proposals for the operations of the campaign, the part that the ministry took thereon, and then consider what inferences may fairly be made. You proposed to pass Lake Champlain, and to reduce Ticonderoga.

Two proposals are then submitted. One for the army to proceed to Albany, and form a junction with Sir William Howe. The other, in case there should be a sufficient force at Rhode Island to co-operate with you, to take the route of the Connecticut. Each proposal supposed a co-operation and junction; the former, at, or near, Albany; the latter,

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at, or near, Springfield, and whichever was adopted, was to be facilitated by a diversion on the Mohawk. And as a security against a possibility of the army's remaining *inactive*, you suggested whether it might not be expedient to trust the latitude of embarking the army by sea to the commander in chief.

With respect to embarking by sea, you say, "more force will be required to be left behind for the security of Canada, than is supposed to be necessary, when an army is beyond the Lakes; and I do not conceive that any expedition from the sea, can be so formidable to the enemy, or so effectual to close the war, as an invasion from Canada by Ticonderoga. This measure ought not to be *thought* of but upon *positive conviction* of its necessity."

After having condemned the measure, it is a little extraordinary, that you should complain of your not having been at liberty to pursue it, especially as no necessity of the army's remaining *inactive* ever did exist.

It was necessary that the army should pass the Lakes, and there were sufficient objects for its employment without proceeding to Albany. The total destruction of the rebels force on the Lakes, and the reduction of Ticonderoga, the key to the communication between Canada and New England, were necessary to preserve Canada from insults.

The reducing Fort George, Fort Edward, Fort Stanwix, and the adjacent country, were momentous objects, and must be as efficacious towards quelling the rebellion, as any expedition by sea. Besides, the service necessary to be performed for the security of Canada, would require so much time as not to admit of your returning to Quebec, and embarking with any prospect of effecting much in that campaign. Therefore that latitude was altogether unnecessary, and had it been given, would have answered no purpose.

Let us now examine your proposal of an expedition by the Connecticut. In the first place, this proposal rested intirely on the
6 principle

principle of the army at Rhode Island being strong enough to co-operate, which was by no means the case, and therefore it was altogether inadmissible. In the next place, supposing a co-operation, it was by far the most arduous and dangerous of the two proposals, because it required land-carriage for upwards of sixty miles on the outset, through a mountainous country, that abounded with dangerous defiles. Add to this, that when you should have reached the Connecticut, you could have had no water-carriage, unless the craft had been carried with you in your progress from the Lake; and when the delays occasioned by the short carrying-places, on the route to Albany, are considered, it shews that this idea was utterly impracticable, and therefore wisely rejected by administration. In the original plan, you mention it as the most difficult of the two proposals, and yet, in your state of the expedition, suggest that it was an expedient of *precaution*, and complain of not being at liberty to avail yourself of it. I venture to affirm, that had the proposed latitudes been given you, at no one period of the campaign would you have seriously

ously thought of returning to Quebec in order to embark by sea, or of taking the route by the Connecticut, as being more practicable and less hazardous than that you attempted. It is impossible that you should think your force adequate to an expedition against the New England colonies, in case it were insufficient to force your way to Albany; or that the army would have been more secure on the banks of the Connecticut, than it was on the banks of the Hudson. In the career of your success, indeed, you thought yourself equal to the attempt, but the Bennington disaster convinced you of the error.

Therefore the remaining proposal, viz. "to effect a junction with Sir William Howe to be facilitated by a diversion on the Mohawk, which was the only practicable one (even by your own shewing), was adopted."

But to conclude, from government having cautiously restricted you to the safest, and indeed only practicable proposal, that the one adopted ceased to be yours, or that you were obliged at all events, even to the sacrificing your whole

whole army, to carry it into execution, is a mode of reasoning that I cannot see the force of.

The peremptoriness of your orders seems to be your principal fort. There, whenever you are pressed, you fly for sanctuary. This therefore deserves particular attention.

Your orders are comprised in the letter from the Secretary of State to Sir Guy Carleton. The material clauses of which are these:

“With a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, it is become highly necessary that the most *speedy junction of the two armies should be effected, &c.*”

“It is his Majesty’s pleasure that you put under the command of Lieut. Gen. Burgoyne, the grenadiers and light infantry, &c. together with as many Canadians and Indians as may be thought necessary for this service; and after having furnished him, in the fullest and completest manner, with artillery, stores, provisions, and every other article necessary
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for his expedition, and secured to him every assistance which it is in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to pass Lake Champlain, and from thence, by the most vigorous exertion of the force under his command, to proceed with all expedition to Albany, and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe."

"It is the King's further pleasure, that you put under the command of Lieut. Col. St. Leger detachment, &c. together with a sufficient number of Canadians and Indians; and after having furnished him with proper artillery, stores, provisions, and every other necessary article for his expedition, and secured to him every assistance in your power to afford and procure, you are to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and down the Mohawk river to Albany, *and put himself under the command of Sir William Howe.*"

"I shall write to Sir William Howe by the first packet; but you will nevertheless endeavour to give him the earliest intelligence of this measure, and also direct Lieut. Col. St. Leger

Leger to neglect no opportunity of doing the same, *that they may receive instructions from Sir William Howe.* You will at the same time inform them that, *until they shall have received orders from Sir William Howe,* it is his Majesty's pleasure that they act as exigencies may require, and in such manner as they shall judge most proper for making an impression on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience; but that in so doing, they must never lose view of *their intended junctions with Sir William Howe as their principal objects."*

The sense and meaning of these orders, viz. That the *two armies* should co-operate so far as was necessary to *effect a junction*, as the primary object of the campaign, and that until you should receive orders from Sir William, you should remain at liberty to act as exigencies should require, or your own judgment direct, only taking care that you should do nothing that would any way interfere with, or prevent a junction, whenever the correspondent arrangements should be made, are so very obvious, that common men could not mistake them; a mere soldier

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could

could not. I will, however, endeavour to follow you in your excursion from the plain road of intuition and common sense.

By reading the correspondence as it is placed, and blended with a variety of matter, in the Parliamentary Register, there is danger of confounding situations, and the instructions they gave rise to. It is only necessary to select, and arrange in their natural order those that relate to any given point, to be convinced that the several instructions which were from time to time issued by Government, were well digested, perfectly consistent, and wisely adapted to the circumstances that occasioned them; and that your insinuation of "plans so inconsistently formed, and managed by the Secretary of State with so much seeming confidence, as to mislead his generals, and so much real reserve as to destroy them," is as unfounded as it is illiberal.

Oct. 9, 1775, Gen. Howe wrote to the Earl of Dartmouth, as follows: "I would propose 12,000 men for New York. This
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corps to be employed in opening a communication with Canada in the first instance. The primary object of opening a communication being obtained *by the two armies*, and secured by proper posts, &c. these corps might take separate routes, &c."

In November, 1776, Sir William Howe, in his letter to Lord George Germaine, makes the following proposal for the campaign, 1777, viz. for an offensive army in the province of New York *to move up the North River to Albany*, to consist of 10,000 men.

Dec. 20, 1776, Sir W. Howe alters his plan, and proposes going to Philadelphia, with the main army, and to have only 3000 men on the Hudson.

This proposal was approved by Government. But Sir W. Howe, on the 20th of January, 1777, after demanding a reinforcement of 20, or 15,000 men, writes, "that if the reinforcements should be small, his operations would be much curtailed; and if

none should arrive, he should be confined to act *in one body in the Jerseys*, leaving only a small corps at Rhode Island, and another of sufficient force for the *defence* of New York and its dependencies.

This dispatch was received March 3, 1777, and this was the last intelligence from Sir W. Howe, that arrived, prior to your orders being issued.

Thus stood the various proposals. His letters were as replete with indecision as his conduct. He was balancing whether he should go north or south, or act in Jersey only: to which point he seemed inclinable and likely to fix. If any confidence was to be placed in Sir W. Howe, or any dependence to be made on his advices, a junction of the two armies was absolutely necessary for an operative campaign, as the reinforcement from Europe would be but small, at best, and even that could not arrive till late. It could not be supposed, after what he had written, that he would go southward with the main army, without a reinforcement. And therefore your complaint of
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being "suffered to fail, ignorant of Sir William Howe's plans," is groundless, for at that time he had none, and that which Government gave him was but the counterpart of your own.

In this state of things, Government complied with Sir W. Howe's request, and gave him the outlines of a plan, at least for the first operations of the campaign, at the same time they adopted yours, which was "to effect a speedy junction of the two armies."

The foregoing instructions were accordingly given to Sir Guy Carleton, and Sir W. Howe was immediately furnished with a copy of them, that he might make his arrangements correspondent to those of the northern army. And lest there should be a want of understanding, both you and Col. St. Leger are required to give Sir W. Howe the earliest intelligence of the measure; and lest there should be a failure of co-operation, and you or Col. St. Leger should force a passage to Albany, without a communication having been opened with New York, and be destitute

tute of support, the instructions direct, "that until orders should be received from Sir W. Howe, both you and St. Leger should act as exigencies might require, or should be judged most proper for making an impression on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience, only taking care not to lose sight of the intended junctions, as the principal object." It is evident, from *once* reading the instructions, that this clause was introduced to guard against those very evils that you rushed headlong into. And as Sir W. Howe neither gave you orders, co-operated, or even took measures that admitted of a junction, you were, through the whole campaign, at full liberty to act as exigencies might require, or your judgment direct, as to proceeding to Albany or not, and in every other respect consistent with making an impression on the rebels, and bringing them to obedience.

It is astonishing that you should hazard a charge so unfounded, as "that the Secretary of State made no mention of the northern expedition in any of his dispatches to Sir W. Howe, in *March*, or *April*, or so unmilitary,

tary, as that he did not mention any orders or recommendation relative to co-operation, *verbally*, to Sir W. Howe's aid de camp, or any other confidential person, who failed about that time."

Government could not be so intimately acquainted with the circumstances of the Southern Army, as by means of your written proposals, and oral information, they were with those of the Northern. Administration had been informed, in general terms, that little was to be expected from Sir W. Howe, unless he was considerably reinforced, but probably did not think themselves competent to furnish him with a plan in detail; nor in this instance could it be deemed necessary, for he had already chalked out the mode in case a junction of the *two armies* was to be effected.

But every one that casts an eye over the instructions must see, that so far as relates to a junction, as the primary object of the campaign, they apply to and embrace *both armies*, and are equally obligatory on Sir William
Howe

Howe and Sir G. Carleton. The *junction* of the two armies is the object of these orders. Philosophers tell us, that action and re-action are equal. If this be an immutable law of nature, the Northern Army could not join the Southern Army, unless the Southern joined the Northern at the same time. After declaring that it was necessary that a speedy junction of the two armies should be effected, and giving instructions for Gen. Burgoyne and Col. St. Leger to proceed to Albany, and put themselves under the command of Sir W. Howe, to communicate as early as possible with, and receive orders from, him, and after furnishing Sir W. Howe with a copy of those instructions, it was surely unnecessary to say to him, that he must make *correspondent* arrangements; and it must have discomposed the muscles of a stoic, if they had added, "You (Sir W. Howe) are not to go so far *south*, or enter upon any measure whatever that will render a *junction* or *communication* impossible."

On the 19th of *April*, the Secretary of State writes to Sir William Howe, and referring

ferring to the instructions respecting the Northern Army, informs him, that the Hanau Chasseurs were also ordered *down the Mohawk to join his army*, and gives him orders respecting employing the Indians, and discontinuing the acting Brigadiers in the Northern Army after a *junction* should have taken place. This letter was also received before Sir William Howe left New York; and had a doubt existed in his mind, respecting the line of conduct that Government intended he should pursue, it must have removed it.

On the 18th of May, Government having received a Copy of Sir W. Howe's letter to Sir Guy Carleton, the Secretary of State writes, "As you must, from your situation and military skill, be a competent judge of every plan, his Majesty does not hesitate to approve the alterations which you propose; *trusting, however, that whatever you may meditate, it will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itself under your command.*" Thus it is evident, that Government never varied from the original idea; and that

was conformable to your own, appears from your proposals, wherein you say, " These ideas (your and St. Leger's expeditions to Albany) are formed on the supposition that it be the sole purposes of the Canada army to effect a *junction with Sir William Howe*, or after *co-operating so far as to get possession of Albany, and open the communication to New York*, to remain on the Hudson's River, and thereby enable that General to act with his whole force to the southward." I am therefore justified in saying, that the insinuation of the paragraph respecting co-operation having been inserted in the official letter of the 18th of *May*, to serve a sinister purpose, does you no honour.

The outlines which were sketched, or rather adopted, by Government for the campaign 1777, were these: The Northern Army was to proceed to Albany, the Southern to co-operate so as to form a junction; and these great movements to be facilitated by two powerful diversions; one on the Mohawk, the other on the coast of Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

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We have already seen the instructions respecting the three former operations; those for the latter are contained in the letter from the Secretary of State to Sir William Howe, of March 3d, 1777. " I must inform you, that his Majesty is also of opinion, that a warm diversion upon the sea-coasts of the Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire would not only *impede the levies for the Continental Army*, but tend much to the security of our trade; and indeed it scarcely admits a doubt, but that these benefits must inevitably result from such an arrangement; for as on one hand, it is scarcely to be expected *that those provinces will part with men*, when their presence must be wanted for the internal defence of their own respective districts; so on the other, a salutary check will unavoidably be put to the successes of the rebel privateers, &c.

This order was very wisely adapted to the situation of the New England provinces; for they had been exempted from furnishing their quota of men for Washington's army that campaign, that they might be at full liberty to oppose the Canada Army. The reluct-

ance of the militia to leave the sea-coast, when there was no apprehension of an invasion by sea; and the violent * means that the Committees had recourse to, in order to compel them to march to the frontiers, leave no room to doubt, but that if Lord Howe had detached a small squadron of the eighty-one ships of war that he commanded, even if no land forces could be spared, it would have been attended with the most salutary effects. Government made such dependence on this measure, that on the 6th of August the Secretary of State writes to Sir William Howe: "Your letter of the 3d of June, together with the intended distribution of the troops, has been laid before the King, and I am commanded to inform you, that his Majesty is concerned that you should find the proposed diversion on the coast of Massachusetts Bay not consistent with the other operations now carrying on; as great advantages would certainly have arisen from that mode of distressing and alarming the enemy."

* The prisons in the New England Colonies were filled with the delinquents. Some were hand-cuffed, and driven or carted through the country *in terrorem*.

None

None of these orders were ever countermanded ; and had any one collateral operation taken place, it would have insured success to the Northern Army. This will be granted, I imagine, since the officers you called to the Bar of the House of Commons were of opinion, that if Sir H. Clinton's attack on the Highlands had been only a week sooner, it would have prevented the catastrophe of your army.

Had a communication between Canada and New York been opened and secured by proper posts, the Northern and Southern Colonies thus separated, and the great peninsula of New England been thus inclosed, I believe every one that knows any thing of America will allow, that it would have put an end to the rebellion.

Your sentiments, at least your declarations, are well known.

Sir William Howe wrote expressly, "*That little resistance would be made to the progress of his*

his Majesty's arms in the provinces of New England, the Jerseys, and Pennsylvania, after the junction of the Northern and Southern Army." The despondency every where visible amongst the Rebels, till it was known that Sir W. Howe had gone southward with the main army, evinces that his opinion was founded.

Reason is confounded, and at a loss for even pretexts and pretences for some of Sir William Howe's conduct.

April 5th, Sir W. Howe writes to Sir G. Carleton: "Having but little expectation that I shall be able, from the want of sufficient strength in this army, to detach a corps in the beginning of the campaign to *act up Hudson's River*, consistent with the operations already determined on; the force which your Excellency may deem expedient to advance beyond your frontiers, after taking Ticonderoga, will, I fear, have *little assistance from hence to facilitate their approach.*"

This paragraph, and the tenor of the whole letter, evinces that Sir William Howe knew that a co-operation was expected. It is indeed an apology for not co-operating.

“ As I shall probably be in *Pennsylvania* when that corps is ready to advance into this province, it will not be in my power to communicate with the officer commanding it so soon as I could wish; *he must therefore pursue such measures as may from circumstances be judged most conducive to the advancement of his Majesty's service, consistently with your Excellency's order for his conduct.*”

Thus, Sir, you was early apprised of Sir W. Howe's going southward, and that you were to act separately, and must shape your course according to circumstances and contingencies.

He there refers to the friends of Government in Albany and its *environs*, and supposes that you will neither need, nor have, any other assistance there; and instead of a co-operation, or junction, proposes only a
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corps on the lower part of the Hudson, to open the communication through the Highlands, &c.

But we shall see that he departed even from this idea. Instead of carrying only 10 or 11,000 men to Philadelphia, the extent of the force mentioned in his proposals to Government for the Southern Expedition, and which would have given him a decided superiority over every thing that Washington either did or could bring to oppose him; he carried 14,000 rank and file, and by that means left the garrison at New York too weak to detach any considerable force. The number of troops intended to have been left was by Sir Henry Clinton deemed too inconsiderable, even for the defence of that post, and upon his remonstrance was increased. The orders given to him we find in Sir W. Howe's letter to the Secretary of State, dated New York, July 7, 1777. Sir H. Clinton arrived here on the 5th instant, and *as this post is of the utmost importance, he will remain in New York, with the command of 22 battalions, disposed according to the inclosed return.*

turn. The instructions I have taken the liberty of leaving with Sir H. Clinton are to be on the *defensive*, with power to act otherwise according to *concurrent circumstances*, without losing sight of the principal object, *the security of New-York.*

Thus, Sir H. Clinton was not *ordered* to open a passage through the Highlands, or to operate at all in favour of the Northern Army, having only liberty to seize any advantage that presented, consistent with the intire security of New-York*.

Accordingly in his answer to your message by Capt. Campbell, wherein you say that you would not have given up your communication with Ticonderoga, had you not expected *a co-operating army at Albany*; that you wished for orders whether you should attack or retreat, and his positive answer whether he would open a communication with Albany; Sir Henry replies, "*That not having received any instructions from the Commander in Chief*

* Sir H. Clinton's enterprize on the North River was as unexpected to Sir W. H. as it was brilliant.

relative to the Northern Army, and unacquainted even of his intentions concerning the operations of that army, excepting his wishes that they should get to Albany, he cannot presume to give any orders to Gen. Burgoyne. Gen. Burgoyne could not suppose that he (Sir Henry) had an idea of penetrating to Albany with the *small* force he mentioned in his letter. What he *offered* in that letter he has now undertaken; cannot by any means promise himself success, but hopes it will be at any rate serviceable to General Burgoyne, as he says that even the *menace* of an attack will be of use."

October 22d, Sir William Howe writes, "I was *surprised* to find Gen. Burgoyne's declaration in his message to Sir H. Clinton by Capt. Campbell, 'That he would not have given up his communication with Ticonderoga, had he not expected a *co-operating* army at Albany;' since in my letter to Sir Guy Carleton, I *positively* mention that no *direct* assistance would be given by the Southern Army. This letter I am assured was received by Sir G. Carleton, and carried by him to Montreal before

before General Burgoyne's departure from thence.

It appears that Sir W. Howe not only rejected every idea of a co-operation and junction, but even that of the Northern Army's reaching New-York. July 7th, he writes, "The order respecting discontinuing the Brigadiers seems only intended to take place when the two armies absolutely *join*; which I do not suppose can happen *this campaign*, as I apprehend *General Burgoyne will find employment for his army against that of the rebels opposed to him.*"

In the last dispatch from Sir W. Howe before he left New-York, dated July 16, he writes, "By the movement of the enemy's army in Jersey towards King's Ferry upon the North River, since the embarkation of his Majesty's troops from Staten Island, he seems to point at preventing a *junction between this and the Northern Army*, which will no further affect my proceeding to *Pennsylvania*, than to make a *small change* in the distribution of the troops*."

Incredible

* Washington was so fully convinced of the necessity of Sir W. Howe's acting on the Hudson, that he supposed his sailing from

Incredible as it may seem, Sir W. Howe carried the main army to Philadelphia at a time when he thought it not improbable that you would have Washington's army, as well as all New-England, to contend with, and without making any diversion on the sea-coast.

Thus the measures which Government had adopted, and the instructions they had issued, were totally disconcerted and counteracted, and the plan formed on the best information and most mature deliberation, the execution of which must have brought all our troubles to a period, was totally frustrated.

On the 8th of May, Government received a copy of the letter from Sir W. Howe to Sir Guy Carleton. But, as you observe, it was known, that when the letter was wrote, Sir William Howe had not received the instructions respecting the Northern Army, and therefore Administration could not suppose that he would be wanting in attention to

from Staten Island was only a feint, and remained so long in the Jerseys, that had Sir W. Howe landed at the Delaware, he would have met with no opposition at Philadelphia, the water force excepted,

them,

them, when they should come to hand. And as he had wrote that the Northern Army must not be expected at Albany before the *middle of September*, had expressed an *impatience* to begin the campaign, and had also wrote, "That he had reason to believe, in case of success in Pennsylvania, there would be found a considerable body of the inhabitants, who might be embodied as militia, and some as provincial troops, for the *interior defence of the province*, which must be a *great aid in the further progress of the War*;" it was natural to suppose, that in case the instructions respecting the Northern Army should not divert him from going southward, that he would be able to co-operate with the Northern Army, after the reduction of Philadelphia. Hence it is evident, that the paragraph in the Secretary of State's letter of the 18th of May, wherein his *Lordship trusts, that whatever he (Sir William Howe) may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the Northern Army, ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itself under his command*, was the natural result of the correspondence between the Minister and Sir William

liam Howe, as well as perfectly conformable to your own ideas; and it places the malevolence of the suggestion, of its having been inserted in consequence of the fall of your army being foretold, in a striking point of light.

True it is, that this dispatch was not received by Sir W. Howe till August. But surely this is not the fault of the Minister. Had Sir W. Howe either attended to the dispatches he received from Government before he left New York, or adhered to what he had written himself, this letter also would have been received in time to have had its full effect.

But when this dispatch arrived at New York, no one there could divine in what part of the terraqueous globe Sir William Howe and his noble Brother were. After having counteracted the instructions they had received, they had betaken themselves out of the reach of any new ones that might be transmitted, and, for upwards of four months,
Govern-

Government knew not where to direct to their general and admiral.

It is curious to trace the route of Sir W. Howe. The operations of the whole campaign indeed are believed, only because we have living vouchers. The history will be read by posterity with the same incredulity that the fabulous legends of antiquity are read by us.

On the 14th of June, he took the field with the whole army, and marched within a few miles of Washington, at Quibbletown. With a force sufficient to have crushed the enemy to atoms in his works, or after leaving a force sufficient to hold Washington in check, to have advanced with the remainder, and reduced Philadelphia (which might have been effected with ease in three days, as the army was provided with pontoons for passing the Delaware, and there were not at that time an hundred continental troops in all Pennsylvania); to the inexpressible joy of the rebels, and equal mortification of the King's troops, he turned his back on the enemy, and returned

turned to Brunswick. From thence he marched to Amboy, crossed over to Staten Island, and embarked his troops in transports, in which he lay till the 23d of July before he sailed. On the 30th of July, he arrived off the Capes of Delaware. After taking a look into that river (as some one observes, to see if it were navigable), he put to sea again, and arrived at Chesapeak Bay on the 16th of August; and on the 25th, debarked his army in so sickly and exhausted a condition, that a fortnight more was necessary to refresh and recruit the troops, as well as to supply the loss which the long voyage, and longer confinement on shipboard, in that sultry season, had occasioned in his horses. So that all the spring and summer, and a great part of autumn, were intirely wasted, and the remainder of the campaign turned to no other account than that of getting comfortable winter-quarters at Philadelphia. On the 22d day of October, having received intelligence of the fate of the Northern Army, as though he had now arrived at the summit of his sublunary wishes, he writes to Administration for leave to resign his command.

I cannot

I cannot forbear just to give a sketch of this General's indecision. In November he proposes that an army of 10,000 men should move up the North River to Albany. In December he proposes going to Philadelphia with the main army, and to have 3000 men only on the North River. In January he writes, that unless he received a re-inforcement, he should act in Jersey only. In July he sailed for Philadelphia without having received a reinforcement. In April he writes to Sir Guy Carleton, that a corps were to act on the Hudson in favour of the Northern Army. In July he goes southward, and leaves no orders for a corps to act on the Hudson. In April he writes to Government, that he should carry 11,000 men only to Philadelphia. In July he carries 14,000. On the 7th of July he wrote, that the two armies could not join that campaign, as Gen. Burgoyne would find employment for his army against that of the rebels opposed to him. On the 16th of the same month he wrote, that Gen. Burgoyne would meet with little interruption, unless Gen. Washington should attempt to force him; and even then he was not afraid of the

consequence. He first proposed to go north, then south, and afterwards became stationary. He first proposed to invade Pennsylvania by land, then to do it by land and sea at the same time, and finally by sea only. On the 16th of July he wrote to Government that he should go up the Delaware, and in a fortnight after sailed for Chesapeak Bay.

I will now return from that dreary barren waste, where the spectator sickens at the indolence, indecision, and error, that every where catch his eye, to a different, but not more cheerful clime; to a region teeming with rash projects, visionary enterprizes, and disastrous events.

I must indeed apologize for being detained so long by Sir William Howe. He is not intended for the principal figure: but in order to give your proportions, it was necessary to draw him at full length. It will not soften your features, though his complexion should be deemed a shade or two darker than your own.

Before

Before you left Montreal Sir W. Howe's letter was communicated to you, by which you knew, that according to the operations then determined on, the principle on which you had relied in proposing, and Government in accepting the plan for the expedition to *Albany*, would not take place, and that the object of that expedition could not be attained.

Had you not acquiesced in Sir William Howe's determination to go southward, you surely would have made him acquainted with your dissatisfaction: and, for the honour of human nature, I will suppose, that had you informed him that the safety or success of your army depended on a co-operation, he would not have deserted or betrayed you.

In your letter from Ticonderoga, which was received by Sir William before he left New-York, you say nothing of a co-operation.

Camp before Ticonderoga, July 2, 1777.

" I wait only some necessaries of the heavy
 " artillery which have been retarded by con-
 " trary winds upon Lake Champlain, to open
 G 2 " batteries

" batteries upon Ticonderoga. *The army is*
 " *in the fullest powers of health and spirits. I*
 " *have a large body of savages, and shall be*
 " *joined by a larger in a few days. Ticonde-*
 " *roga reduced, I shall leave behind me pro-*
 " *per engineers to put it in an impregnable*
 " *state; and it will be garrisoned from Canada,*
 " *where all the destined supplies are safely ar-*
 " *rived. My force will therefore be left com-*
 " *plete for future operations.*"

The evidence rises still higher. In your
 letter from Skeensborough of July 11th, you
 write, " Your Lordship will pardon me if I a
 " little lament that my orders do not give me
 " the latitude I ventured to propose in my
 " original project for the campaign; to make
 " a real effort instead of a feint upon New-Eng-
 " gland. As things have turned out, were I
 " at liberty to march in force immediately by
 " my left instead of my right, I should have
 " little doubt of subduing, before winter, the
 " provinces where the rebellion originated,
 " *If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I still*
 " *hope this plan may be adopted from Albany.*"

The

The letters alluded to are suppressed, and, as you and Sir W. Howe make common cause, it is not probable that the Public will ever have a sight of them. There is, however, sufficient ground to conclude, that they contain the fullest assurance of your ability to act independent of the Southern Army, and a request for liberty to do it; and that it was upon the strength of these advices, that Sir William Howe, notwithstanding he had wrote on the 7th of July that no junction could be formed that campaign, as you would find sufficient employment against the rebels opposed to you, only nine days after writes, that you would meet with little interruption, unless Washington should attempt to force you; and even then, such was your strength, that he should be under no apprehension from the event. And in this way only can we account for his abandoning the idea of a corps acting on the Hudson in your favour, carrying 14, instead of 11,000 troops to Philadelphia, and thereby leaving the garrison at New York too weak to detach.

On

On the 17th of July, Sir William Howe writes to you from New York, "My intention is for *Pennsylvania*, where I expect to meet Washington; but if he goes to the northward, contrary to my expectations, and you can keep him at bay, be assured I shall soon be after him, to relieve you."

"After your arrival at Albany, the movements of the enemy will guide your's; but my wishes are, that the enemy be drove out of this province before *any operation takes place in Connecticut*. Sir Henry Clinton remains in the command here, and will act as occurrences may direct. *Putnam is in the Highlands with about 4000 men.*"

This letter shews, that there was a perfect understanding between you and Sir W. Howe. He knew you were desirous of turning your force against *New England*, but wished you first to clear the province of *New York* of rebels; and so far from holding up any encouragement of a co-operation, the whole tenor of the letter shews that he had not an idea of it (unless Washington should go northward),

nor even of opening a passage through the Highlands. And your letter of August 6, wrote after the receipt of Sir W. Howe's, is a further confirmation of your resting satisfied with his measures. In this dispatch, which Sir H. Clinton was to read in its passage to Sir W. Howe (which circumstance proves that you supposed him to be gone southward), you neither ask, nor appear to expect any co-operation. On the contrary, you make such a display of your brilliant success and rapid progress, and of the services rendered by your numerous Indian auxiliaries, as must have induced both Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Howe to think, that you did not even wish for any assistance from New York.

Thus, Sir, it is evident that you were not barely a quiescent: If you were not a principal, you were equally culpable as an accessory, in preventing the intended co-operation from New York, though you modestly impute its failure to the neglect of the Minister.

Sir H. Clinton might, therefore, very justly remark, that "General Burgoyne *could not*

not suppose that he had an idea of penetrating to Albany :” And Sir W. Howe might well exclaim, “ I was surprised at General Burgoyne’s declaration, that he would not have given up his communication with Ticonderoga, had he not expected a *co-operating army at Albany*, since I *positively* mentioned that he could have no direct assistance from the Southern Army.”

Notwithstanding the principle of a co-operation or junction was so totally abandoned, you every where conclude from it. You would induce the world to believe, that because you were ordered to force your way to Albany, to form a junction with Sir William Howe, you were therefore obliged to force your way to Albany, after you knew that he was gone southward, and could neither join nor succour you. In one case it was practicable, in the other chimerical. In the former, you could be supplied and succoured from New York; in the other, it was impossible to procure subsistence for your army. Without magazines having been previously formed, your army
could

could scarcely have subsisted at Albany in a time of profound peace; but *flagrante bello* with an enemy determined to burn and drive all the country before you, as you say the rebels were, and without a communication either with Canada or New York, it was utterly impossible*.

Pray what was Albany to you, without a co-operation of the Southern Army? It is not an object of itself. Albany is an inconsiderable town, situate near the confluence of the Hudson and Mohawk, without a single fortress, and surrounded by commanding heights. The inhabitants were generally well affected to Government, but they were disarmed, and you had not arms to put into their hands. Could you have forced your way to the spot, you would probably only have had the melancholy view of its ruins; for the rebels would rather have laid it in ashes, than suffered it to shelter the King's troops.

* This is admitted in the State of the Expedition.

As the point of the junction, Albany was indeed important; but as soon as that idea was abandoned, it lost all its consequence.

Besides, the co-operation of Sir W. Howe and Col. St. Leger would have enabled you to have reduced the country as you advanced, and to have secured it by proper posts. This would have been effectual; whereas the barely marching through a tract of country, with an enemy rising up behind you at every step, had very little tendency to quell the rebellion, which was the object of the war. In short, by Sir William Howe's going southward, the whole system of operation, of which the expedition to Albany was a constituent part, was unhinged; and your remaining in the vicinity of Ticonderoga became necessary, even for the security of that post*.

* Gen. Burgoyne had no sooner crossed the Hudson, than Gen. Lincoln marched directly upon the ground over which the British Army had passed, and five days afterwards retook 100 prisoners, took 293 royalists, Mount Defiance, Mount Hope, the French Lines, the Block-House, the Landing, 200 bateaux, &c. and as soon as Gen. Burgoyne surrendered his army, Ticonderoga was abandoned as untenable.

But,

But, Sir, as you adhere so closely to the letter of your instructions in one part, may I ask, how it happened, that after reading them an *hundred* times, you disregarded the letter in others? You might have read, that "the expedition could not be advantageously executed without the assistance of the Indians." Government, at an immense expence, had obtained you that assistance. Your army, you confess, was "by no means in a condition to dispense with them;" yet you advanced after they had left you in disgust.

You must have read, that your expedition was to have been facilitated by a diversion on the Mohawk; yet after that had failed, you continue your progress.

Your instructions also required you to proceed (literally) "with all expedition," yet you encumbered your army with forty-two pieces of artillery.

And even in the instance you fix upon, viz. "to force your way to Albany," you are

partial in a double sense ; for you reject the latter half of the sentence, “ *and put yourself under the command of Sir William Howe,*” as nugatory.

In the instance of a few detached words you adhere to the letter, against the sense, and in every other part counteract both sense and letter.

You were not, indeed, by the letter of your orders, restrained from advancing, in case you found it impossible to feed your army, because such an exception had hitherto been deemed a needless precaution.

You were not insensible of the necessity of establishing a chain of posts as you advanced, or of your *duty* in that respect ; for in your letter of July 29, to Sir G. Carleton, you write, “ A breach into my communication must either ruin my army intirely, or oblige me to return in force ; to restore which, might be the loss of the campaign. To prevent a breach, *Ticonderoga* and *Fort George* must be in very respectable strength ; and I must, besides,

sides, have posts at *Fort Edward* and other *carrying-places*."

I must stand acquitted of *judging by events*, or from *after-knowledge of facts and circumstances*, because your own letters and evidence furnish me with almost every fact that I state, and indeed almost every inference that I should have made, and evince that they occurred to you at the time. In your lucid intervals, truth and reason appear, though the infatuation that seized you was fatally predominant in the end.

Under the before-described circumstances, it is demonstrably certain, that you were not bound by your *orders* to proceed to Albany; of course you became responsible for the operations of the campaign.

Friendship may wish to conceal, and interest may labour to remove, but the landmarks of truth are fixed and permanent. The faithful pen of history will record, that

The

The Canada expedition was planned upon the principle of a co-operation of the Southern Army, so far as to effect a junction of the two armies as the primary object.

Sir W. Howe and Gen. Burgoyne understood the instructions in that sense, but wished to act separately; the Northern Colonies having as powerful attractions for the one, as the Southern Colonies had for the other.

In this state of mutual repulsion, Sir W. Howe proposed, and Gen. Burgoyne heartily acquiesced in, the carrying on their operations intirely independent of each other.

At first, General Burgoyne's successes were rapid and brilliant; and had they been followed up with all possible expedition, the issue would probably have been fortunate; but his unnecessarily forcing his way through an immense forest, with incredible labour and fatigue, gave time for the panic the rebels had been thrown into, to subside *.

Incum-

* To force a passage, it was necessary to construct above forty bridges, besides repairing causeways, one of which was
of

Incumbered with forty-two pieces of artillery, besides baggage incompatible with a rapid march, his movements were slow.

In order to obtain a supply of live cattle and *baggage* † horses, he detached five hundred men to make a detour of two hundred miles, through the most dangerous and rebellious part of the country, and directly in the face of the rebel army. This detachment was intirely cut off, having scarcely advanced

of log work, and more than two miles in extent; by which means the army was twenty days in advancing as many miles, when, by taking the route of Lake George, they would have had level roads, and plain sailing. Those that conclude, that the operations of the campaign were not retarded by this movement, because the enemy was finally a-head of the provisions, do not consider the difference that the same labour, applied to the transport of provisions from Lake Champlain to Lake George, would have made. The same kind of logic is used to prove, that the artillery and baggage were no impediment. They affect not to consider, that if the horses, carriages, and water-craft, which transported the park of heavy artillery and the baggage, had plied only in the commissary of provisions department, that it would have enabled the army to move with celerity.

† Col. Baum was ordered to obtain 1300 horses to assist in transporting the *no* baggage of the army.

thirty miles, and a reinforcement came near sharing the same fate.

This disaster turned the fortune of the war, completed the defection of the Indian auxiliaries, whom the General had before disgusted, occasioned the failure of the expedition on the Mohawk, discouraged the well-affected provincials from rising, and drew together the whole rebel force of the Northern Colonies *.

Knowing that every collateral operation had failed ; with only a month's provision ; having an enemy in front *confessedly* superior ; and assured of a large body taking place immediately behind him, Gen. Burgoyne crossed

* Gen. Burgoyne's observation, " That when a Minister states a common accident of war to have been fatal to a whole campaign, of which he directed the progress, and apportioned the force, he makes but an ill compliment to his own judgment," is unfounded, because it supposes the Minister to have directed the army to proceed to Albany without any co-operation. This fallacy pervades all the General's exculpatory and criminating performances. It is abundantly proved by the General's own witnesses, that the means were adequate to the end, in case there had been a co-operation, and therefore the Minister must for ever stand acquitted.

the Hudson, and abandoned his communication with Canada and his magazines, without any prospect of one being opened with New York.

Five days afterwards, the rebels gave him battle, the fortune of which was so equivocal, that each army claimed the victory.

If the royalists were not repulsed, they were effectually checked, and the impracticability of advancing was self-evident. It was, however, yet in his power to retreat; but he sat down ("in the jaws of famine, and invested by quadruple numbers"), and betrayed a consciousness of inferiority by fortifying his camp*.

In order to keep up the spirits of his army, he gave in orders, "that powerful armies were co-operating with them†," and remained

* Gen. Burgoyne began to fortify his camp before the receipt of Gen. Clinton's letter.

† Gen. Burgoyne constantly held up this idea from the time he issued his proclamation at Putnam Creek, to the 3d of October, when he gave it in orders. The officers tell us, that they

mained so long in his fortified position, that in a council of war he declared, " Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the distance is such as to render any relief from him improbable, during the time our provisions could be made to last." " A defeat is fatal to the army; a victory does not save it, as they have neither provisions to advance or retreat against an enemy."

After fighting another battle, in which the enemy had the advantage, he retreated two days with all his incumbrances, without loss, and in good order, then halted; and without any further struggle committed his brave companions to the honour and faith of rebels and traitors, upon the vain expectation that they would allow his army a free passage to England, to relieve an equal number of troops, who were to assist in quelling the rebellion the next campaign.

they did not know the contrary till after the convention. It is not therefore to be wondered at, that the Generals Phillips and Frazer expressed no disapprobation at passing the Hudson, or that Gen. Burgoyne's orders were executed with alacrity.

Thus

Thus, by a series of misconduct, increasing in such a ratio, that each step seems calculated to efface the memory of all that preceded ; by manœuvres which were all his own, and precluded a possibility of success ; by means, the bare stating of which carries with it such intuitive evidence as to supersede all argument, General Burgoyne totally lost his army, and reduced his country to a predicament disgraceful as it was calamitous ; and finally, having exhausted all the resources of simulation and diffimulation, he forfeited the claim to pity.

Thus this uncommon meteor, eccentric as a comet, and baneful as a malignant planet, rushed from a blaze of light into darkness and obscurity.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

Page 31, line 19, for, *He there*, read, *He then*.

Page 47, line 18, for, *a quiescent*, read *acquiescent*.

